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Abstract 
 
This Note reviews the performance of the Hong Kong dollar Linked Exchange Rate 
system since the introduction of the three refinements to it in May 2005.  It presents an 
analytical framework which argues that, in a fully credible exchange rate target zone 
regime, the spot exchange rate normally stays inside the band but does not have a natural 
tendency to converge towards the centre of the zone.  While a certain level of interest 
rate differential between the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar may persist, it should 
not grow significantly larger than what is implied by the width of the Convertibility Zone.  
Judged against this framework, the developments since May 2005 point to increased 
credibility of the refined Linked Exchange Rate system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) introduced the three 
refinements to the Hong Kong dollar Linked Exchange Rate system (LERS) in 
May 2005 to remove uncertainty about the extent to which the exchange rate may 
strengthen and help align Hong Kong dollar interest rates more closely with their 
US dollar counterparts.  This paper reviews the operations of the LERS since then 
to better understand interest rate and exchange rate dynamics after the reform.  It 
attempts to address the following questions: Have the “three refinements” achieved 
their intended objective of normalising Hong Kong’s monetary conditions amid 
large speculative capital inflows?  Can the developments in the money and 
foreign exchange markets since May 2005 be characterised as normal?  What do 
those developments tell us about the credibility of the refined LERS?  What 
should we expect from the relationship between exchange-rate and interest-rate 
spreads in a fully credible target zone regime? 
 
 
II. WHY WERE THE “THREE REFINEMENTS” INTRODUCED? 
 
 Hong Kong experienced persistent inflows of funds during 
2003-2005 driven by weakness of the US dollar, market speculations about a 
revaluation of the renminbi, and strong economic recovery in Hong Kong.  In the 
absence of an explicit commitment by the HKMA to sell Hong Kong dollars on the 
strong side, the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate appreciated abruptly from 
around 7.80 to 7.70 in late 2003.  To stabilise the exchange rate, the HKMA 
stepped in to conduct strong-side monetary operations.  As a result, the Aggregate 
Balance expanded sharply to peak at about HK$55 billion in early 2004, pushing 
Hong Kong dollar interbank interest rates downward to almost zero.  Despite the 
negative interest rate differentials, no obvious outflow of funds occurred for a 
considerable period because market participants acted on the belief that the Hong 
Kong dollar would appreciate alongside the renminbi and used the Hong Kong 
dollar as a trading proxy.  These speculative activities made the interest rate 
adjustment mechanism under the LERS ineffective. 
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 To normalise monetary conditions and to make the interest rate 
adjustment mechanism more effective, the HKMA introduced the three 
refinements to the LERS on 18 May 2005: establishing a strong-side Convertibility 
Undertaking (CU) at HK$7.75/US$, shifting the weak-side CU from 
HK$7.80/US$ to HK$7.85/US$, and creating a Convertibility Zone defined by 
CUs, within which the HKMA may conduct market operations consistent with 
Currency Board principles.  
 
 After the three refinements were introduced, the HKMA also made 
efforts to educate the public about the case for continuing the LERS and the 
rationale of the reforms, and convince market participants to decouple the 
relationship between the Hong Kong dollar and the renminbi.  The Chief 
Executive of the HKMA reiterated that the Hong Kong Government had no 
intention to change the anchor currency for the Hong Kong dollar peg to the 
renminbi in speeches and his weekly Viewpoint column.1  Research papers were 
published to provide analytical backing to the argument that Hong Kong’s 
economic and trade structure support the case for a continued peg with the US 
dollar.2  There was also close communication between HKMA staff in charge of 
market operations and their market counterparts.  These efforts helped anchor 
market expectation and achieve the objectives of the three refinements to 
normalise domestic monetary conditions and promote the smooth functioning of 
the Currency Board system. 
 
 
III. HAVE THE OBJECTIVES BEEN MET? 
 
 Although the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate stayed close to 
the strong-side CU in the latter half of 2005 and in 2006, the CU was never 
triggered and the Aggregate Balance remained stable (Chart 1).  In other words, 
the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate has decoupled from that of the renminbi.  
This was an important achievement, especially considering that other regional 
economies were experiencing strong net capital inflows and the renminbi was 
                                                 
1 Joseph Yam issued more than 10 Viewpoint articles on the refined LERS between May 2005 and April 
2007, including, “The Strong-Side Convertibility Undertaking” on 19 May 2005, “The Convertibility 
Zone” on 26 May 2005, “Refinements to the Linked Exchange Rate System” on 16 June 2005, “The 
First Anniversary of the Three Refinements” on 18 May 2006, “The Future of the Hong Kong Dollar” on 
24 August 2006, “Twenty-Third Anniversary of the Linked Exchange Rate System” on 12 October 2006, 
and “The Renminbi and the Hong Kong Dollar” on 30 November 2006. 
2 Examples include “Hong Kong’s Economic Integration and Business Cycle Synchronisation with 
Mainland China and the US”, Research Memorandum 11/2006; “Structural Determinants of Hong 
Kong’s Current Account Surplus”, Research Memorandum 14/2006, and “Hong Kong’s Trade Patterns 
and Trade Elasticities”, Research Memorandum 18/2006. 
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facing continuous and strong political pressures to appreciate.  Equity inflows to 
the Hong Kong dollar market, driven partly by the US$10 billion initial public 
offering (IPO) of the Bank of China in May 2006 and the US$15 billion IPO of the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in October 2006, helped keep Hong 
Kong dollar interest rates low.  However, instead of further pushing down interest 
rates and the spot exchange rate, investors expatriated capital in search for higher 
yields.  As a result, portfolio outflows more than offset equity inflows.  These 
capital flow patterns indicate that market players have avoided testing the resolve 
of the HKMA to honour the CUs.  
 
Chart 1:  Movements in Hong Kong dollar exchange rate 
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Source: HKMA. 
 
 While the negative spreads of Hong Kong dollar interest rates 
compared with the corresponding US dollar interest rates persisted, they never 
exceeded 150 basis points, and in any case were much smaller than the levels seen 
in late 2004 (Chart 2).  Along with interest rates increases in the US, rising Hong 
Kong dollar interest rates had a timely cooling effect on the local property market.  
In fact, from a macroeconomic point of view, since the introduction of the three 
refinements, the local monetary conditions have been broadly neutral and can be 
considered as appropriate for the prevailing cyclical conditions in Hong Kong. 
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Chart 2:  Movements in interest rate spreads 
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Source: HKMA. 
 
 However, the decoupling of the Hong Kong dollar from the renminbi 
in the forward exchange market took longer than in the spot market.  While the 
three-month Hong Kong dollar forward exchange rate has been fluctuating within 
the Convertibility Zone most of the time, the 12-month Hong Kong dollar forward 
exchange rate was persistently outside the Convertibility Zone from late 2005 to 
early 2007 (Chart 3).  In addition, the broad movements in the 12-month Hong 
Kong dollar forward exchange rate correlated closely with those in the 12-month 
renminbi non-deliverable forward exchange rate from May 2005 to the end of 2006 
(Chart 4). 
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Chart 3:  Hong Kong dollar forward exchange rates 
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Source: HKMA. 
 
Chart 4:  12-month Hong Kong dollar and renminbi forward rates 
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Source: HKMA. 
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 In early 2007, the situation started to change.  The 12-month Hong 
Kong dollar forward exchange rate depreciated towards the strong-side CU despite 
the continued appreciation of the renminbi.  This showed that the 12-month 
forward exchange rate had also decoupled from that of the renminbi3 (Chart 4).  
At the same time, the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate depreciated beyond 
7.80, the centre of the Convertibility Zone, in the first quarter of 2007, and the 
12-month interest rate differential narrowed to about 100 basis points (Chart 5).  
This pattern of movement is consistent with the “covered interest rate parity” 
relationship.  
 
Chart 5:  Adjustments of Hong Kong dollar forward exchange rate 
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IV. WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT IN A CREDIBLE TARGET ZONE REGIME? 
 
 Theoretical arguments imply that in an exchange rate target zone 
regime, which the refined LERS encompasses, the position of the spot exchange 
rate within the band does not have any particular economic significance, and there 
is no natural tendency for the spot rate to revert to the centre of the band.  When 
economic fundamentals create upward pressure on the currency, unless the 
monetary authority intervenes, the exchange rate will tend to move towards the 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, the exchange rates of forward contracts longer than one year continue to be stronger than 
the strong-side CU. 
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strong side of the target zone.  However, the boundary is unlikely to be touched if 
the target zone is credible, because as the exchange rate moves very close to the 
boundary, market participants will have no incentive to push it to the limit as they 
know that the monetary authority will then step in and pull it back.4  Hence the 
exchange rate is likely to hover around the boundary of the band as long as the 
economic fundamentals do not change.  Once the economic fundamentals change 
to call for a weaker exchange rate, the whole process will reverse and the exchange 
rate will move towards the weak-side of the band, but again is unlikely to touch it.  
 
 Movements in the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate since the 
introduction of the three refinements have largely conformed to this theory.  
When the spot exchange rate was under appreciating pressure during the second 
half of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, it stayed close to the strong-side CU, but 
the CU was never triggered.  Twice the exchange rate was only several pips away 
from the strong-side CU; when that happened, however, the exchange rate 
immediately depreciated away from the strong-side CU.  The spot exchange rate 
started to depreciate in December 2006 and has now moved towards the weak-side 
of the Convertibility Zone, but is still some distance away from it.  It remains to 
be seen how the spot exchange rate will behave when it is close to the weak-side 
CU.  
 
 A fully credible exchange rate target zone regime also implies that 
the forward exchange rates should either be inside the target zone or stay close to 
the band.  If the forward rates are far outside the target zone, profits can be made 
by entering into outright forward contracts, provided that the future spot rate stays 
within the target zone.  If market participants have faith in the monetary 
authorities’ commitment to defend the band, they will have incentives to conduct 
such arbitrage and the forward rates will be brought within the target zone.  
However, if market participants have doubts about the monetary authorities’ ability 
or willingness to defend the band, then such arbitrage activities might not occur 
and the forward rates might continue to lie outside the zone.5  
 
 There are two plausible theories, which are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, that might explain why the 12-month Hong Kong dollar forward 
exchange rate was persistently stronger than the strong-side CU of 7.75 from late 
                                                 
4 Further research is needed to understand better under what circumstances the boundaries may be touched 
and official intervention may be triggered in a credible target zone regime. 
5 Such doubts need not imply a belief that the target zone concept will be abandoned but merely that the 
width of the zone might be increased.  Indeed, some market commentators raised this possibility in the 
aftermath of the introduction of the three refinements.  
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2005 to 2006.  The first theory emphasises the importance of opportunity cost: 
since the local equity market offered very high rates of returns for the major 
market players, they did not take the trouble to arbitrage away the potential profits 
arising from the mis-pricing of the forward exchange rates.  They would be 
further discouraged from conducting these arbitrage trades if transaction costs and 
the inherent risks involved in such longer-term trades are taken into consideration: 
as the holding period of an open position of an arbitrage trade lengthens, the 
marked-to-market losses in the interim period are potentially larger and more 
volatile.  
 
 The second theory hypothesises that market participants had some 
initial worry that the HKMA might widen the band in one to two years.  The 
lingering doubt in the market about the HKMA’s commitment to not widening the 
band prevented arbitrage trades from driving the forward exchanges towards the 
strong side CU.  However, these worries have diminished since early 2007.6  
The HKMA’s communication strategy played a key role in changing market 
perception: in preparation for the Hong Kong dollar reaching parity with the 
renminbi, HKMA senior executives and staff maintained close communication 
with traders and researchers throughout the third quarter of 2006.  This effort, 
together with speeches given and articles written by the Chief Executive of the 
HKMA, helped stabilise market expectation.  
 
 The strengthened credibility of the refined regime in recent months 
reflects the HKMA’s deeds as well as its words.  Since January 2007, when the 
HKMA has been seen to be maintaining the LERS even as the renminbi first 
reached parity with and then became stronger than the Hong Kong dollar, market 
participants appeared to have finally become convinced that the LERS would not 
be abandoned or altered after all.  This change in market perception led to 
arbitrage activities that brought the one-year forward rate inside or close to the 
strong-side CU.  It also helped make the appreciation of the renminbi beyond the 
Hong Kong dollar spot rate a non-event.  
 
 The existence of a certain level of interest rate spread against the 
anchor currency is consistent with a fully credible exchange rate target-zone 
regime.  Under such a regime, just as there is no natural tendency for the spot 
exchange rate to revert to the centre of the band, there is also no natural tendency 
                                                 
6 Market participants still appear to have considerable doubts about the credibility of the strong-side CU in 
the medium term (i.e., within two to five years), although the lack of liquidity in the market of forward 
contracts of longer duration makes the interpretation of forward discount somewhat ambiguous. 
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for the interest rate spread to become zero.  Under the covered interest rate parity 
condition, if the target zone system is fully credible and both the Hong Kong dollar 
spot exchange rate and the 12-month forward exchange rate stay inside the 
Convertibility Zone, then the current width of 1,000 pips of the Convertibility 
Zone can at most accommodate a negative interest rate spread of 127 basis points, 
assuming zero transaction cost.7  An interest rate spread larger than 127 basis 
points implies that the forward exchange rate lies outside the convertibility zone, 
assuming the covered interest rate parity condition holds.8  
 
 The movements in the Hong Kong dollar interest rate spreads against 
the US dollar since the introduction of the three refinements convey the same 
message as in the case of the Hong Kong dollar forward exchange rates: while 
market frictions and opportunity costs might have prevented market players from 
conducting arbitrage, and market participants might have had doubts about the 
HKMA’s future commitment to the LERS, the opportunity costs have declined and 
the doubts have diminished considerably since January 2007.  While the interest 
rate spreads widened to 150 basis points in late 2006, they have now declined to 
around 100 basis points.  As pointed out earlier, the depreciation of the spot 
exchange rate and the narrowing of the interest rate spreads since January 2007 
were part of the same process that moved the 12-month forward exchange rate 
close to the strong-side CU. 
 
 Inside the target zone, and some distance away from the intervention 
limits, changes in the spot exchange rate and changes in the interest rate spread are 
determined by various market forces.  Ample empirical evidences from around 
the world show that short-run movements in spot exchange rates are not 
predictable by “fundamental” variables such as interest rate differentials, trade 
balances, prices, and money supply.  In statistical terms, the spot rate tends to 
move as a “random walk”.  The short-term interest rates, on the other hand, are 
determined by the demand for and supply of reserve balances (the Aggregate 
Balance) of the banking system.  In the absence of interventions or discretionary 
                                                 
7 This is calculated using the following covered interest rate parity condition:  
 
 
t
mt
t
USD
m,t
HKD
m,t
S
F
i1
i1 +=+
+
 
 
 where m,ti stands for LIBOR or HIBOR with a maturity of m months; Ft+m is the m-month forward 
exchange rate; S is the spot exchange rate. 
8 Our analysis shows that the covered interest rate parity does hold for Hong Kong after allowing for a 
reasonable amount of transaction costs. 
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open market operations within the target zone, the supply of reserve balances to the 
banking system as a whole will be constant as long as the exchange rate does not 
touch the boundaries of the zone.  The demand for reserves will primarily reflect 
precautionary motives on the part of the banks, which will depend on prevailing 
market conditions.  The market for reserve balances is cleared by changes in the 
interbank interest rates.  
 
 Such behaviour patterns imply that, in a credible exchange rate target 
zone, the correlation between movements in the exchange rate and the interest rate 
spread can be positive, zero, or negative as a result of market forces.  What sign 
the correlation takes at any particular time depends on the underlying sources of 
the changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate spread.  Nevertheless, while 
we should not expect any particular stable correlation between changes in the 
exchange rate and changes in the interest rate, in normal market circumstances, the 
daily changes tend to be small and smooth.  
 
 The correlation between changes in the Hong Kong dollar exchange 
rate and changes in the interest rate spread against the US dollar since May 2005 
has largely followed the above theoretical predictions.  The blue, green and red 
lines in Chart 6 show the movements in the 12-month interest rate spread and the 
spot exchange rate in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively.9  From late 2005 to early 
2006, as the exchange rate stabilised around 7.75 and the negative interest rate 
spread widened, the correlation between the two was almost zero.  As the spot 
exchange rate depreciated in response to the widening of the negative interest rate 
spread throughout 2006, the relationship between the two became negative.  
When the spot exchange rate depreciated and the negative interest rate spread 
narrowed in 2007, the correlation became positive.  It is also clear that the daily 
changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate spread were generally smooth 
and small.  
                                                 
9 When both the spot and the 12-month forward exchange rates are within the Convertibility Zone, data 
points showing the movements in the 12-month interest rate spread and the spot exchange rate will fall 
within the grey area in Chart 6. 
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Chart 6:  Movements of interest rate spread and spot exchange rate 
(1.40)
(1.30)
(1.20)
(1.10)
(1.00)
(0.90)
(0.80)
(0.70)
(0.60)
(0.50)
(0.40)
(0.30)
(0.20)
(0.10)
0.00
7.75 7.76 7.77 7.78 7.79 7.80 7.81 7.82 7.83 7.84 7.85
Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate
12-month HIBOR-LIBOR spread (%)
2005
2006
2007
 
Source: HKMA. 
 
 The experience so far also shows that the refined LERS has worked 
well without recourse to the third element of the three refinements, which allows 
the HKMA to conduct discretionary monetary operations within the Convertibility 
Zone if necessary.  In fact, intra-zone intervention only took place once to smooth 
out interest rate volatility induced by an IPO shortly after the three refinements 
were introduced.  Since then, there has been no intervention, even during several 
very large IPOs in 2006. 
 
 
V. WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE? 
 
 To summarise, a fully credible exchange rate target zone regime 
should exhibit the following characteristics: 
 
? The spot exchange rate normally does not touch the CUs, as market 
expectation of intervention by the HKMA at the limits will stabilise the 
market exchange rate.  The spot rate does not necessarily have a tendency 
to move towards the centre of the zone.  In fact, no particular significance 
should be attached to the position of the spot exchange rate within the 
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Convertibility Zone. 
 
? The forward exchange rates should normally be inside the Convertibility 
Zone or stay close to the CUs, unless there are sufficiently large market 
frictions and transaction costs that prevent arbitrage from taking place. 
 
? A certain level of spread of the Hong Kong dollar interest rate against the 
US dollar is consistent with a fully credible Convertibility Zone.  The 
spread does not necessarily move towards zero.  
 
? There is no stable pattern of correlation between the interest rate spread and 
exchange rate movements within the Convertibility Zone. 
 
? In a fully credible target zone regime, there is little need for intra-zone 
intervention, unless market anomalies existed.  
 
 Developments so far have shown that the refined regime has become 
more credible, as the Hong Kong dollar forward exchange rate drifted back 
towards 7.75 and the interest rate spreads narrowed.  The decoupling of the Hong 
Kong dollar from the renminbi, and the more-or-less neutral monetary conditions 
prevailing in Hong Kong, attest to the success of the three refinements.  This 
outcome has been achieved without the HKMA having to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market in the past two years. 
 
 
